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In the year 1968, Senator Hart of Michigan sent me to the State Depart- ment to do something that I believe no one who has handled energy
policy on the government side has ever done before or since — I read the
entire State Department archive from 1900 to 1968: fifteen, five-drawer
file cabinets with every memorandum of conversation, every presidential
speech on the subject, all the run-up material, all of the background mate-
rial.
What I found was an archive that showed that the government had
people with minimal knowledge on the subject, who got their information
about problems from the people in the industry, and who would manipulate
the information to get the result they wanted. And when things would get
out of control, they would offer advice to steer the solution in a direction
that would best serve the economic interests of the industries.
The first and most important thing for you to understand is that for at
least fifty years in the history of the oil industry, its biggest problem was
too much oil — I reiterate, too much oil — because the price of oil goes
down like a rock in a situation of oversupply. The price of oil in the United
States of America, actually went below zero during the time of the Great
Depression, when the big fields in Texas came in and gushers spilled out on
fields damaging crop land, because there was no storage.
The oil industry has been terrified by new supplies of oil, which would
be so cheap they would undercut the value of existing production. So if you
are an oil company and you have oil that is being produced at 10 dollars a
barrel and some fool finds a field in Saudi Arabia where the oil costs,
literally, eight cents a barrel out of the ground when it is first discovered,
you are going to want that Saudi oil not to be produced. And that’s exactly
what happened.
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In every one of these cases where new oil was found, there were pro-
found and long negotiations and cartelization to prevent cheap production
from knocking down the world price of oil. There’s a marvelous story of the
Iraq Petroleum Company, which will give you the history of why we are in
a war in Iraq today.
There was in Iraq a company put together by the major oil companies. It
was part of a cartel. The whole story is laid out by the Federal Trade
Commission in a 1940 report that was held until after World War II because
all antitrust action was suspended for the duration of the war. The major oil
companies had come together in a meeting and had decided who would
produce oil where. In the Iraq Petroleum Company, the oil was jointly
owned by the Americans, Brits, and French.  They all had a vote on how
much would be produced, and it was agreed that they would not bring on
new production unless they were all involved in equal degrees.
The problem with Iraq Petroleum Company was it was the result of the
coup in 1957 and the oil was nationalized. The governments of the United
States and the United Kingdom and, for a while, the French, said, “That’s
our oil.  We’re going to make it impossible for you to sell it anywhere in the
world,” and they shut the Iraq Petroleum Company’s production down cold.
The French began to cheat. They went backstairs to the Iraqis and said,
“Look, we’ll cut a deal with you. Forget the embargo these guys are run-
ning. We’ll go behind their backs and we’ll help you sell the oil on world
markets.” The Americans and the Brits used diplomatic pressure on the
French not to do it, and we punished the Iraqis for nationalizing the oil.
At the time it was clear to the American companies that the reserves in
Iraq were greater than those in Saudi Arabia. And our interest in Iraq was
in keeping very cheap Iraqi oil off the market.
But the real problem is not Iraq, it is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the
elephant in the closet. In 1945 after Yalta, President Roosevelt and King
Saud met. Harold Ickes had developed a proposal to turn the Saudi Arabian
reserve over to an American company, called the Petroleum Reserves
Corporation, which would be owned by the federal government. Ickes
perceived that if this reserve was left in private company hands, it would be
developed to suit the needs of private companies not the national interest,
but that debate was never had in public.
The companies took the reserve and we entered into a marriage, with the
devil — a family that says, “We own the country. We get to keep all the
money that comes out of these reserves, no matter who else lives in the
place. And, by the way, we are going to run the country as a thirteenth-
century monarchy. And you, by God, are going to keep it that way and
protect us in that job in perpetuity.”
So we have a problem here. And it was the same problem we had in Iran.
When you set up such a situation: a dictatorial, non-Democratic, vicious
government, and you get them in power and you give them all that money,
they figure out that they can use the money to manipulate your government.
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So they buy in: they buy into your politicians; they buy into your consulting
firms; they buy into your political systems; they buy into your advisors.
The Shah did it. The Saudis do it. And, by God, as long as the money is
flowing back, which was Henry Kissenger’s contribution to this mess, you
don’t care, because it’s coming back and being invested in your own coun-
try. So, the attitude is, forget about the deficit. That’s not important. The
question is, are they buying our bonds?  And as long as they are, who really
cares?
But the money is here, not there. And the guys who run that country think
they own it.  And we, of course, are sufficiently delusional to believe that
the guys who run that country will listen to us when, in fact, they figure
they bought us and we have to listen to them. Again, it is a marriage with
the devil and a very serious problem.
Now here’s the real nexus.  The Iraq war comes because this has been the
elephant in the closet for American foreign policy for the last thirty years.
Every administration has been on its knees praying that the corrupt Saudi
government will not collapse on their watch, that the thirteenth-century
government will stagger through another four years, and that the problem
that results when that government goes will be the next administration’s
problem. Because, the truth is, there are two politically unacceptable propo-
sitions in American politics. One, gas lines, which destroyed Jimmy Carter,
would destroy anybody else who had to confront them. Two, an unaccept-
ably high price of oil would cause riots, economic disruption, and all kinds
of other problems. So what happens if there is a real disruption in supply?
There is economic chaos. There is political chaos. Nobody wants it.
What happens if the government collapses in Saudi Arabia? There is the
prospect of real chaos and the situation has been getting more and more
untenable as time has gone by, with 22 million people in Saudi Arabia, two
million slaves, God knows how many tribals who don’t get a cut of the
action, a bunch of Shia who are working in the oil fields who aren’t part of
the royal family and won’t get the cut.
Essentially two million people get the wealth of the country, and every-
body else is cut out. This is not a long-term security situation.
The invasion of Iraq is a reflection of this insecurity. Because had Saddam
Hussein continued in power and the Saudi government collapsed, we’d be in
a real mess, because then all of the oil in the Middle East would be out of
our control. None of it would be sold by American companies. And that is
really the bottom line issue: our American companies selling world oil
outside of the United States.  Think about that.
Now I want to say a couple of other things about reserves which are a
function of place and time. Nobody looks for more oil than they
reasonably expect to use in the next fifteen years. Period.  Because once
you’ve got fifteen years of reasonable supply, if you’re a corporation, why
the hell do you spend more money looking for more oil to use thirty years
from now?
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The second point is about price. At a certain price there is enough oil to
take care of the world, even with wildly escalating demand for hundreds of
years into the future. The question is, at what price? There are such things
as tar sands and artificial ways of producing oil. We’ve got the stuff, the
problem is price.  It gets too high. The real constraints are environmental.
And finally I have a story that came from my investigation in the seven-
ties, when I was able to look at any document I wanted to see inside the
Chevron Corporation.  For reasons that I can’t go into, we (the Foreign
Relations Committee) issued a subpoena and as a result were invited to, as
the Chevron Corporation said, “Come search. Look for what you are
looking for. You can see anything in the place.”
I found in that place the corporation’s forward planning documents. All
their economists were doing exactly what economists always do:  take a
point here and project it to infinity. It’s a very simple kind of proposition.
We expect annual growth at blah, blah, blah, and here is the curve. And
they had different cases, high growth, medium growth, low growth. They
had all the usual projections. And then there was one future planning
document that showed no growth. What was this?  What was this document
about? And I met with the Chairman of Chevron and said, “What happened
here?  Why did you propose this?” And he responded, “Well, you know,
there was a story of the grain of gold and the emperor. When asked what he
wanted he said, ‘All I want you to do is take this chessboard and put one
grain on the first square and then for the next year put two grains and then
keep multiplying, geometrically each year until we get to the last square at
which point it would be clear that all the gold in the world was on the
chess board.’”
What he was saying was this: “We cannot keep infinitely expanding the
growth of the use of petroleum.” It just is not possible. There is not enough
capital unless we want all the capital in the world to be used to produce
energy. And that is the core problem.
I have listened to many somewhat glib statements about converting other
energy sources.  And it sounds wonderful. But the turnover for the U.S.
vehicle fleet is a minimum of ten years. If we started tomorrow, with hydro-
gen or something else, figure minimum ten years. Assuming everybody went
out in their usual time to buy a new car, we’d get there in ten years, maybe.
Then there is a problem of supply. Think about the universality of the
availability of gasoline.
And then ask yourself, what kind of infrastructure would it take to
provide similar universal availability for an alternative fuel. Then think
about the dumb way we have constructed our suburbs, which require the
use of fuel, and ask yourself what the cost of correcting that stupid
mistake will be.
And the dumbest of these easy solutions is, “By the way, we will use
corn.”  I would say that we are committed as far as continuing to use
petroleum.  And it is important to acknowledge that a major use of petro-
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leum for which there is no substitute is aircraft fuel. You can’t go to coal or
natural gas. Over 20 percent of the current use of petroleum is to fly air-
planes, and there’s no good alternative fuel for that.
In the long term the things we have to worry about are continuity of
supply, protection through the strategic reserve, and then finally, how to
break this terrible cycle of going to bed with the devil. And that’s our deal
with Saudi Arabia. It’s our deal with Equatorial Guinea.  It’s our deal with
one little dictatorship after another.
The crooks who run these countries take the money, put it in our banks,
use it for their own personal purposes, and as long as it is invested here,
we’re happy and they’re happy. We get that oil.
But it all has to stop, because it’s not sustainable.
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